And Another Case Involving Agricultural Land, But Abutters Have No Standing to Challenge Sale to Third Party

The seller in this case entered into an agreement to sell a 21 acre cranberry bog to a buyer who intended to discontinue the agricultural use. As was the case in the Watermark case, the seller provided the Town Manager with the notice of intent to sell for nonagricultural use. However, the statute, G.L. c. 61A, § 14, requires that notice also be sent to the board of assessors, the planning board, the conservation commission, the state forester, and the select board. There was no evidence that the notice was sent to all required parties.  

G.L. c. 61A, § 14 states that if the contents of the notice of intent are non-compliant, the municipality must notify the landowner within 30 days of receipt. The Town Counsel notified the landowner that the notice was non-compliant but only well beyond the 30 day deadline and after the property had been sold to the buyer. The Town argued that the 30 day deadline did not apply because the content of the notice was not deficient, it just hadn’t been sent to all necessary parties. In any event, the seller did not resend the notice and ignored the Town’s claim that the title was now “defective and defeasible.”  

Abutters were unhappy with the Town’s failure to exercise the right to purchase and had pushed the Town to issue the arguably untimely notice of non-compliance. They and a newly formed non-profit sued the Town, the seller, and the buyer, seeking a declaration that the sale was invalid and an order directing the private parties to comply with the notice provisions of G.L. c. 61A, § 14. 

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the abutters and non-profit lacked standing to sue. The statute does not provide for a private cause of action for an inadequately served notice. Moreover, the intent of the statute is to preserve agricultural land, not to preserve the property values of abutting land. Since the non-profit's members would not have standing, the non-profit itself did not have standing. Mandamus was not warranted since the Town sent notice to the seller that the notice was non-compliant. In so finding, the Court did not mention the fact that the Town’s letter was well outside the 30 day deadline in section 14, thereby impliedly agreeing with the Town that the deadline was inapplicable when non-compliance was in the failure to notify all necessary entities rather than with the content of the notice. The case is Banevicius v. Town of Barnstable, SJC-13845 (May 20, 2026).